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Objective. Propose a cognitive taxonomy of medical errors at the level of individuals and their interactions with technology.
Design.Use cognitive theories of human error and human action to develop the theoretical foundations of the taxonomy, develop
the structure of the taxonomy, populate the taxonomy with examples of medical error cases, identify cognitive mechanisms for each
category of medical error under the taxonomy, and apply the taxonomy to practical problems.
Measurements. Four criteria were used to evaluate the cognitive taxonomy. The taxonomy should be able (1) to categorize major
types of errors at the individual level along cognitive dimensions, (2) to associate each type of error with a speciﬁc underlying
cognitive mechanism, (3) to describe how and explain why a speciﬁc error occurs, and (4) to generate intervention strategies for each
type of error.
Results. The proposed cognitive taxonomy largely satisﬁes the four criteria at a theoretical and conceptual level.
Conclusion. Theoretically, the proposed cognitive taxonomy provides a method to systematically categorize medical errors at the
individual level along cognitive dimensions, leads to a better understanding of the underlying cognitive mechanisms of medical
errors, and provides a framework that can guide future studies on medical errors. Practically, it provides guidelines for the de-
velopment of cognitive interventions to decrease medical errors and foundation for the development of medical error reporting
system that not only categorizes errors but also identiﬁes problems and helps to generate solutions. To validate this model em-
pirically, we will next be performing systematic experimental studies.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The medical error report from the Institute of Med-
icine [1] has greatly increased peoples awareness of the
frequency, magnitude, complexity, and seriousness of
medical errors. As the eighth leading cause of death in
the US with as many as 98,000 preventable deaths per
year, ahead of deaths due to motor vehicle accidents,
breast cancer, or AIDS, medical error has received in-
creased attention from academic, healthcare, and gov-
ernment institutions and organizations. As a result of
the report and subsequent increased funding for re-
search from US government and private institutions,
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doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2004.04.004and reported recently (e.g., JAMIA Special Supplement
in 2002 [2] and JBI Special Issue in 2003 [3]). There is
accordingly an urgent need to develop theoretical
foundations to provide insight into the nature of medi-
cal errors. Without such foundations it will be diﬃcult
to understand the fundamental factors and mechanisms
of the problem such that medical errors can be pre-
vented or greatly reduced systematically on a large scale.
One of the needed foundations is the cognitive basis of
medical errors. The purpose of this article is to propose
a taxonomy of medical errors that is based on their
cognitive mechanisms. Such a taxonomy will be useful
and signiﬁcant for medical error research and develop-
ment activities in the medical informatics community,
such as identifying targeted categories of medical errors
for interventions by designing speciﬁc decision-support
and other information systems, providing user-interface
design guidelines for medical devices and health infor-
mation systems, providing an ontology for designing
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tured dataset for the analysis and mining of medical
error data.
Why are cognitive factors fundamental in medical
errors? Let us ﬁrst consider the various levels of the
healthcare system hierarchy at which medical errors
might occur (see Fig. 1). At the core level of the hier-
archy, it is individuals who trigger errors, although the
individuals may not be the root cause of such errors.
Cognitive factors of individuals, such as memory loss,
attention switching, deviations in skilled performance
and actions, cognitive load, reasoning errors, decision
biases and faulty heuristics, etc., play the most critical
role here [4–6]. This is traditionally the domain of re-
search for cognitive psychology, cognitive science, and
human factors. At the level of Individual-Technology
Interaction, errors can occur due to various factors in
the interactions between an individual and technology.
This is an issue of human–computer interaction where
cognitive properties of interactions between a human
being and technology aﬀect and sometimes determine
human behavior [7–16]. A key challenge for medical
error research at this level is to design medical devices
and systems in a way that certain medical errors are
made impossible by design. At the level of Distributed
Systems, errors can be attributed to the social dynamics
of interactions between groups of people who interact
with complex technology in a distributed cognitive sys-
tem. This is the issue of distributed cognition, computer-
supported cooperative work, and the sociotechnical
approach to human-centered design [9,12,14,15,17–24].
A key issue at this level is to understand medical errorsFig. 1. A system hierarchy that we have devised to illustrate the roles of
human errors in medicine.that are due to social–technical factors such as infor-
mation ﬂow, team dynamics, the practice of cognitive
work, process reengineering, and cultural and environ-
mental properties. At the level of Organizational
Structure, errors can be attributed to factors inherent in
organizational structures such as coordination, cooper-
ation, and collaboration among various units; commu-
nications, organizational change, organizational
memory, group decision making; and the standardiza-
tion of work processes, skills, and input and output [25–
28]. At the Level of Institutional Functions, errors can
be indirectly traced back to institutional policies and
guidelines [29]. And at the level of National Regulations,
errors can be reduced or prevented if systematic and
comprehensive requirements such as usability and hu-
man factors testing for medical devices are mandated for
vendors as a component in the approval process of
medical devices [30]. Although the properties at the six
levels of the system hierarchy can be studied indepen-
dently, a cognitive foundation for the system is essential
for a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of
medical errors across the full span of the hierarchy.
The importance of cognitive factors in medical errors
can also be seen from the perspective of error event
chains (see Fig. 2). Consider a typical device use error,
found in the FDAs Manufacturer and User Facility
Device Experience Database (MAUDE), in which a
nurse, trying to program an infusion pump to deliver
130.1ml/h, presses the keys ‘‘1 3 0 . 1’’ but is unaware
that the decimal point on the device only works for
numbers up to 99.9. The pump ignored the decimal
point key press and, as a result, was programmed to
deliver 1301ml/h. Such errors are typically blamed on
the user and ‘‘solved’’ by recommending that the user
(or users) be retrained. Unfortunately, this analysis
overlooks several important factors that contributed to
the error. Why did the decimal point only operate up to
99.9? Why does the device simply ignore the decimal
keypress, instead of alerting the user and requiring him
or her to reenter the entire number? Why was the device
not designed in a way such that it accepts decimal point
correctly? Why was the nurse unaware of the limitation?
Was training, which is important for a badly designedFig. 2. A schematic drawing of the chain of events leading to an error.
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covered in training? Why was the order written for
130.1, an amount that the pump was incapable of de-
livering? Why did the nurse not see that the display
showed 1301? Was the display hard to read? Was the
device placed at an angle that distorted the display? Was
the nurse in a hurry or tired? Was the hospital under-
staﬀed? When we consider the full range of factors that
may have contributed to the error, it is clear that the
individual user who triggered the error is at the last stage
of the chain, but may not be the root cause of the error.
If the chain of events can be stopped at the individuals
stage through interventions, potential errors could be
prevented. Even if errors proceed through the last stage,
a good understanding of the situation by individuals can
help them to recover from the errors and to minimize the
potential impact. In the example above, cognitive fac-
tors must be considered during device design, device
procurement, device programming, training, the clinical
environment, and order entry.
Medical errors are often triggered by human errors
that occur during the healthcare process as a result of
the interplay between human beings and the systems in
which they are embedded. According to Reason [1,4],
human error is the failure of a planned sequence of
mental or physical actions to achieve the intended out-
come when this failure cannot be attributed to chance.
By this deﬁnition, medical error is a cognitive phe-
nomenon because it is an error in human action which is
a cognitive activity. To prevent human error, the system
in which humans work must be adapted to their cogni-
tive strengths and weaknesses and must be designed to
ameliorate the eﬀects of human error that does occur.
To design such a system, it is critical to understand the
underlying cognitive mechanisms of medical errors.
Although understanding the cognitive basis of medi-
cal errors is an important step to reducing adverse
events—patient injury resulting from medical manage-
ment rather than the patients disease—it is only part of
the picture, because not all adverse events are caused by
medical errors. For example, a device malfunction, such
as an infusion pump that delivers the wrong dose due to
a mechanical failure, may lead to an adverse event, but
is not a medical error. Adverse events may also arise
from system level problems even when all of the indi-
viduals working in the system do not make an error. For
instance, McNutt et al. [29] describe a case resulting in
cardiac arrest due to delays in care caused by organi-
zational policies. There are also non-preventable adverse
events. For example, a patient who gets a usual dose of
drug may suﬀer an unpredictable reaction.
The objective of this article is to develop a taxonomy
of medical errors that is based on the cognitive factors
and mechanisms at the level of Individuals and at the
level of Individual-Technology Interaction in the system
hierarchy shown in Fig. 1. We acknowledge that manytaxonomies can be developed for medical errors for
diﬀerent purposes. For example, medical errors can be
categorized according to the levels in the system hier-
archy in Fig. 1. This taxonomy is valuable for identify-
ing the factors of medical errors at various levels of the
system hierarchy. Medical errors can also be categorized
according to diﬀerent task domains where medical er-
rors occur (e.g., surgery, medication, radiology, diag-
nosis, etc.). This taxonomy is valuable to identify the
frequency and severity of medical errors in each task
domain such that special attention can be dedicated.
Furthermore, for a sub-category of medical errors, such
as medication errors, a detailed taxonomy can be de-
veloped to list the various factors for documentation
and other purposes [31,32]. The cognitive taxonomy that
we develop here serves a purpose that has not been
addressed systematically in the medical error research
community: describing, understanding, and explaining
medical errors. Ideally, we need a meta-taxonomy that is
composed of several taxonomies that emphasize diﬀer-
ent issues and are for diﬀerent purposes. Such a meta-
taxonomy will be important for the interventions of
medical errors.2. Theoretical background
One critical step toward a cognitive foundation of
medical errors is to develop a cognitive taxonomy
of medical errors that can (1) categorize major types
of medical errors along cognitive dimensions, (2) asso-
ciate each type of medical error with a speciﬁc under-
lying cognitive mechanism, (3) describe how and explain
why a speciﬁc error occurs, and (4) generate intervention
strategies for each type of error.
The purpose of this paper is to propose an action
based cognitive taxonomy that can potentially satisfy
the four criteria listed above. This taxonomy is built
upon two theoretical grounds: Reasons deﬁnition of
human error [4] and Normans action theory [10,33]. We
describe these two theoretical perspectives ﬁrst.
2.1. Reason’s deﬁnition of human error
Reasons [4] deﬁnition of human error is one of the
most widely accepted: an error is a failure of achieving
the intended outcome in a planned sequence of mental
or physical activities when that failure is not due to
chance. According to Reason, human errors are divided
into two major categories: (1) slips that result from the
incorrect execution of a correct action sequence and (2)
mistakes that result from the correct execution of an
incorrect action sequence. Slips have been extensively
studied and are better understood (for reviews, see [4,5]).
In comparison, there have not been as many studies of
mistakes.
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To be comprehensive, descriptive, predictive, and
generalizable, a cognitive taxonomy should be based on
a cognitive theory that has explanatory and predictive
power. Since human errors are deﬁned as errors in hu-
man actions, a cognitive theory of human actions can
provide the theoretical foundation for the cognitive
taxonomy. A cognitive theory of human action that is
particularly pertinent for understanding the nature of
medical errors is the seven-stage action theory developed
by Norman [10,33] and reﬁned by Zhang and colleagues
[34,35]. The seven-stage action theory is shown in Fig. 3,
with an example showing the action cycle of entering the
volume of drug to be infused with an infusion pump.
According to this theory, any action has seven stages of
activities: (1) establishing the goal (e.g., ‘‘set volume to
be infused at 1000 cc’’), which is abstract and indepen-
dent of the system or concrete setting; (2) forming the
intention (e.g., ‘‘use keypad to enter 1000’’), which is
concrete and dependent on the actual system or concrete
setting; (3) specifying the action speciﬁcation (e.g.,
‘‘press 1 0 0 0’’), which is the formation of the sequence
of actions to be carried out; (4) executing the action
(e.g., ‘‘physically pressing 1 0 0 0’’), which is physically
carrying out the actions; (5) perceiving the system state
(e.g., ‘‘volume: 1000 cc, with 1000 highlighted’’), which
is to detect and recognize any changes in system state;
(6) interpreting the state, which means to make sense of
the information perceived from the perception stage
(e.g., ‘‘1000 cc is displayed, but what does the high-
lighting mean? Has the pump accepted the value, or
must I press another button?’’); and (7) evaluating the
system state with respect to the goals and intentions
(e.g., ‘‘determine if the system has accepted the volume,
i.e., press key to start infusion’’), which is to check if the
original goal has been completed.
It is worthwhile to describe the diﬀerence between
goals and intentions. Goals are typically high level ob-Fig. 3. Normans seven-stage theory of action.jectives that are abstract and independent of the system
or concrete setting. In the example in Fig. 3, ‘‘set volume
to be infused at 1000 cc’’ could be implemented in dif-
ferent ways, depending on the actual system being used.
For infusion pumps with a keypad, as in Fig. 3, it is
carried out by typing the numbers. For other infusion
pumps, it is done by using up–down arrow keys to in-
crement or decrement a displayed value, and some
pumps support both means of entry. Intentions are in-
stantiated goals in a speciﬁc system or setting. In the
example in Fig. 3, the intention is ‘‘use keypad.’’ In a
pump without a keyboard, the intention may be ‘‘press
up arrow.’’ Intention has more details than goals.
The action cycle in Fig. 3 embodies a simple task that
has no subgoals or represents one of the levels of a
complex task that has subgoals. The complete action
diagram for a complex task with several levels of sub-
goals will include many nested action cycles. To limit
our scope for this discussion, we use the action cycle of a
simple, one-level task to develop our taxonomy.3. The cognitive taxonomy
Reason developed one of the most well-known
taxonomies of human errors [4]. However, it was not
based on a theory of human action. It focused primarily
on slips, not on mistakes; and it has not been system-
atically applied to medical settings. Normans [33] seven-
stage action theory was developed for the study of
human–computer interaction and the design of user
interfaces. It has not been applied to the study of human
errors.
The cognitive taxonomy we propose here adopts
Reasons deﬁnition of human error and his basic cate-
gorization of human errors into slips and mistakes. Our
taxonomy is also an application and extension of Nor-
mans action theory to the categorization of medical
errors. It is an action-based cognitive taxonomy. This
taxonomy can cover major types of human errors, be-
cause a human error is an error in an action and any
action goes through the seven stages of the action cycle.
In our taxonomy, errors (both slips and mistakes) can
occur at any of the seven stages of action: due to in-
correct translation from goals to intentions, incorrect
action speciﬁcations from intentions, incorrect execution
of actions, misperception of system state, misinterpre-
tation of data perceived, and misevaluation of inter-
preted information with regard to the goal of the task.
We extend Reasons deﬁnition of an ‘‘action sequence’’
to include steps on the evaluation side as well as the
execution side of the action cycle. According to Reasons
deﬁnition a slip is an incorrect execution of a correct
action sequence, whereas a mistake is the correct exe-
cution of an incorrect action sequence. In our model,
these actions include steps on the evaluation side of the
J. Zhang et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 37 (2004) 193–204 197action cycle (see right-hand side of the cycle in Fig. 3).
For example, misinterpreting feedback because of ex-
pectations (e.g., reading 1301 as the expected 130.1) is a
slip, whereas misinterpreting feedback because of in-
correctly acquired or missing knowledge (e.g., thinking
that a blinking red light means the device is working,
when in reality it means the battery is low) is a mistake.
It may help to think about slips and mistakes in the
context of the competence–performance distinction, ﬁrst
used by Chomsky [36] to characterize the diﬀerence
between linguistic competence (a persons tacit knowl-
edge of a grammar) and linguistic performance (that a
person often produces sentences inconsistent with their
grammatical knowledge). In the context of medical er-
rors, competence refers to a persons knowledge of how
to perform a task or process, or how a device must be
operated. This knowledge may be correct, incorrect, or
incomplete. Performance describes a persons actual
behavior. When behavior leads to a failure because of
incorrect or incomplete knowledge, we call this a mis-
take. When the knowledge is correct, but a failure oc-
curs, we call this a slip. For example, we all know the
diﬀerence between a computer mouse and a cell phone,
but if a mouse and cell phone are next to each other on
our desks, we may accidentally pick up the mouse when
the phone rings or we may accidentally reach for the
phone when we want to move the mouse—both exam-
ples of a slip. In contrast, a mistake involves missing or
incorrect knowledge.
3.1. Slips
Under our cognitive taxonomy, slips can be divided
into execution slips and evaluation slips (see Fig. 4 and
Table 1).
3.1.1. Execution slips
Execution slips are associated with the execution of
an action. They occur at stages of Goal, Intention, Ac-
tion Speciﬁcation, and Execution.Fig. 4. Proposed cognitive taxo3.1.1.1. Goal slips. Goal slips can be caused by many
cognitive mechanisms. In human memory, a goal may
be forgotten because of high memory load, delays, or
interruptions (loss of activation). A correct goal could
be distorted because of its similarity to a more common
goal. For an activity that has multiple tasks occurring
concurrently or sequentially, the goals for diﬀerent tasks
can be mixed up (concurrent and sequential cross talk).
For an activity with multiple tasks, the goals for some of
the tasks may get lost because the goals are too nu-
merous to be kept in working memory (overﬂow of goal
stacks). In the goal slip example in Table 1, the goal of
‘‘seeing patient A’’ is forgotten and the doctor moves to
the goal of ‘‘seeing patient B.’’ This is an example of loss
of activation.
3.1.1.2. Intention slips. Similar to goal slips, intention
slips can also be caused by loss of activation, altered
intention, concurrent and sequential cross talks, and
overﬂow of working memory. A goal is at the level of
the users task and is independent of the device or tool
being used, whereas an intention is a goal tied to the
speciﬁc features or functions of the device. For instance,
if your goal were to view the next page of a document,
you would intend to turn the page of a written document
or scroll to the next page of an electronic document. In
each case, the intention is tied to the tool you are using,
whereas the goal is independent of the tool. In the in-
tention slip example in Table 1, the intention was to
enter the infusion pump rate using the up–down arrow
keys. This technique is required on the most frequently
used pumps. However, on the present device the arrow
keys move the highlighted selection region, instead of
changing the selected number. Although the nurse knew
this, the more common intention was retrieved instead.
This is a capture slip: a well-learned intention is re-
trieved instead of the correct intention.
3.1.1.3. Action speciﬁcation slips. Action speciﬁcation
slips can be caused by associative activation, description,nomy of medical errors.
Table 1
Slips
Stage in action cycle Examples Cognitive mechanisms Potential solutions
Execution slips Goal slips A doctor was called out of the room to
answer an urgent call and afterwards he
went to the room of a diﬀerent patient who
was next in the queue. (Loss of activation)
 Loss of activation  Provide memory aids
 Cross talk (concurrent)  Reduce multitasking
 Cross talk (sequential)  Reduce interruptions
 Altered goal  Reduce goal stacks
 Overﬂow of working
memory
 Train users
Intention slips A nurse intended to enter the rate of infusion
using the up–down arrow keys, because this
is the technique required on the pump she
most frequently uses; however, on this pump
the arrow keys move the selection region
instead of changing the selected number.
(Capture)
 Loss of activation  Provide memory aids
 Cross talk (concurrent)  Reduce multitasking
 Cross talk (sequential)  Situated actions
 Altered intention  Reduce interruptions
 Overﬂow of working
memory
Action speciﬁcation
slips
A nurse intends to decrease a value using
the decrement function, but pushes the
down arrow key (which moves to the
next ﬁeld) instead of the minus key.
(Associative activation)
 Associative activation  Automation
 Description  Decision support
 Failure of retrieval  Situated actions
 Situated activation  Train users
 Cross talks  Direct action
Action execution
slips
‘‘I meant to turn oﬀ the antibiotics IV
only, but turned oﬀ the infusion pump
completely.’’ (Double capture)
 Capture  Automation
 Double capture  Visualization
 Perceptual confusion  Display design
 Deviation of motor
skills
 Reduce interruption
 Misﬁring  Memory aids
Evaluation Slips Perception Slips A patient died of liquid aspiration because
the water trap connected with a tube had no
mechanism to protect against reﬂux to
patient’s trachea, and there was no
feedback in the system. (Lack of perception)
 Lack of perception  Direct perception
 Misperception  Immediate feedback
 Mis-anticipation
Interpretation Slips A yellow ﬂashing light on a medical device
was interpreted as non-critical when it really
meant critical. (default knowledge)
 Default knowledge  Display design
 Conﬁrmation bias  Decision support
 Information overload  User training
 Memory aids
 Situation awareness
Action evaluation
slips
A user pressed the start button on an infusion
pump after which the pump indicated that it
had started infusing, so the user assumed the
patient was receiving the drug; however, the
user had forgotten to open the clamp on
the hose, so no drug was being delivered to
the patient.
 Lost memory of goal  Memory aids
 Lack of feedback  Display design
 Insuﬃcient information  Action tracking
 Ambiguous
information
 Information reduction
 Evaluating diﬀerent
goal
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The action speciﬁcation slip example in Table 1 is caused
by associative activation, which is the activation of
similar but incorrect knowledge. In this case, a nurse
intended to decrease the volume to be infused by using
the decrement key of the device, rather than keying
in the new value. The nurse immediately thought to press
the down arrow button and correctly executed this
command and then noticed that this moved the high-
lighted line from volume to be infused to rate. The nurse
knew that he should have pressed the minus key instead,
but associative activation of similar knowledge, namely
that down arrows are often used to decrement numbers,
led to an action speciﬁcation slip. In this example, theintention (use the decrement key) was correct, but the
speciﬁcation was incorrect. In contrast, in the intention
slip example described previously the intention itself was
incorrect. A description slip [5] is another type of action
speciﬁcation slip, which is an incomplete or ambiguous
speciﬁcation of an intended action that is similar to a
familiar action. Failure of retrieval of a well-learned
action sequence can also result in an action speciﬁcation
slip. Sometimes a strong environmental stimulus can
automatically and unconsciously activate an action that
replaces the current intended action. When multiple
tasks are performed concurrently or sequentially, there is
always the possibility of cross talk between the action
components of the tasks.
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of a correctly speciﬁed action sequence, slips could
occur due to capture and double capture [4,5], per-
ceptual confusion, deviation of motor skills, misﬁring
of actions, and other mechanisms. A capture slip is the
automatic activation of a well-learned routine that
overrides the current intended activity. For example,
an intended action of ‘‘taking a medication with milk’’
can be overridden by ‘‘drinking milk alone,’’ which is a
stronger routine action. A double capture slip is the
unintended activation of a related strong action rou-
tine. The action execution slip example in Table 1 is a
double capture slip. In this case, the intended action
‘‘turning oﬀ the antibiotics IV is overridden by ‘‘turn-
ing oﬀ the infusion pump completely,’’ which is an
unintended related routine. Action execution slips can
also be caused by perceptual confusion (e.g., misread-
ing of a handwritten prescription), deviation of motor
skills (e.g., typos in the typing of radiology report),
misﬁring of action rules (e.g., due to the superﬁcial
match of the conditions for certain actions), and other
mechanisms.
3.1.2. Evaluation slips
Evaluation slips are associated with the evaluation of
the outcomes of an action. They occur at the stages of
Perception, Interpretation, and Action Evaluation.
3.1.2.1. Perception slips. Perception slips can be caused
by lack of perception, misperception, and mis-anticipa-
tion. The perception slip example in Table 1 is caused by
lack of perception. In this case, there was no display,
either auditory or visual, of the current state of the
system. To get the information about the erroneous
state of the system, one had to infer it by looking at and
comparing the level of the patient and the level of the
system. Misperception is another source of perception
slips. It is the incorrect perception of correction infor-
mation. This could be caused by many factors such as
environmental conditions (e.g., light and noise) or the
displays or systems themselves (e.g., hard to read text
and hard to hear signals). Mis-anticipation can also
cause perception slips. In this case, the perception of the
outcome of an action may be distorted and biased by the
anticipation of a speciﬁc outcome even if the actual
outcome turns out to be diﬀerent from the anticipated
outcome.
3.1.2.2. Interpretation slips. Interpretation slips can be
caused by diﬀerent factors, such as default knowledge,
conﬁrmation bias, and information overload. The in-
terpretation slip example in Table 1 was caused by de-
fault knowledge, which ﬁlls unknown variables in the
knowledge structure with default values. Typically, a red
warning light, not a yellow warning light, indicates a
critical situation that needs immediate attention. In thisspeciﬁc case, the yellow light was designed to indicate a
critical situation. The operator had this knowledge but
unfortunately interpreted it using the default meaning of
a yellow light (non-critical). Conﬁrmation bias is the
tendency to interpret the outcome as a piece of con-
ﬁrming, positive, or consistent evidence for ones hy-
pothesis or anticipation. Thus, an outcome incompatible
with the goal might be misinterpreted as one that indi-
cates the completion of the goal. Information overload
is another factor that could cause misinterpretation or
incomplete interpretation of the outcome of an action.
In this case, the information of the outcome might need
a lot of processing before becoming interpretable, or it
might be buried in a complex array of information re-
sources.
3.1.2.3. Action evaluation slips. Action evaluation slips
could be caused by the loss of the memory of the ori-
ginal goal of the task. In this case the evaluation cannot
be performed because there is no goal to be evaluated.
Insuﬃcient or ambiguous information for evaluation
may sometimes force the operator to make a decision to
either conﬁrm or disconﬁrm the completion of the ori-
ginal goal of a task, which could lead to errors. In a
multi-task environment, multiple evaluations of multiple
goals could be mixed up: an evaluation might be per-
formed for a diﬀerent goal. The evaluation slip example
in Table 1 was caused by the inappropriate activation of
knowledge. To achieve the goal of starting infusion
therapy, the user normally opens a roller clamp on the
IV tubing, and then presses the start button on the in-
fusion pump. In this case, the user forgot to open the
clamp and pressed start, causing the pump to indicate
that it was beginning to infuse—action feedback that the
user evaluated as meeting the goal of starting the infu-
sion.
3.2. Mistakes
In comparison with slips, there have been much
fewer studies on mistakes in medicine, probably due to
the complexity and depth of domain knowledge that is
required to understand and study mistakes in medicine.
Most studies about mistakes in the past were byprod-
ucts of studies of reasoning biases and heuristics in
decision-making tasks [37,38]. Recently there has been
a growing number of studies that explicitly examine
various types of mistakes in medicine [39–41]. We ex-
pect to see more studies of this kind. Here we only
describe the basic categories of mistakes under our
taxonomy. However, the framework of our taxonomy
allows accommodating new data and theories as they
become available.
Under our cognitive taxonomy, mistakes are catego-
rized into execution mistakes and evaluation mistakes
(see Fig. 4 and Table 2).
Table 2
Mistakes
Stage in action cycle Examples Cognitive Mechanisms Potential solutions
Execution
mistakes
Goal mistakes Incorrect diagnosis due to neglect of base rate
information. (Biases)
 Incorrect knowledge  Education
 Incomplete knowledge  Decision support
 Misuse of knowledge  Representational aid
 Biases & faulty
heuristics
 Information overload
Intention mistakes A physician treating a patient with oxygen set the
ﬂow control knob between 1 and 2 liters per
minute, not realizing that the scale
numbers represented discrete, rather than
continuous, settings. (Incomplete knowledge)
 Incorrect knowledge  Education
 Incomplete knowledge  Decision support
 Misuse of knowledge  Representational aid
 Biases  Information reduction
 Faulty heuristics  Display design
 Information overload
Action speciﬁcation
mistakes
Strange burn scars appeared in post-operative
patients in a hospital. The problem was caused
by electric discharge of a device that was not
grounded. The device has a blinking red light
to signal the problem, but the device operators
did not know the meaning of the signal.
(Incomplete knowledge)
 Lack of correct rules  Education
 Misﬁring of good rules  Decision support
 Encoding deﬁciencies
in rules
 Representational aid
Action execution
mistakes
For example, a perfect knowledge of a surgical
procedure may not lead to a successful surgical
operation if the operator has not extensively
practiced the procedure. (Dissociation between
knowledge and rules)
 Misapplication of good
rules
 Education
 Dissociation between
knowledge and rules
 Representational aid
 Automation
Evaluation
mistakes
Perception mistakes A pharmacist ﬁlling prescription for Lamisil
(an antifungal) mistakenly perceived Lamictal
(an anticonvulsant) as Lamisil because he
mistakenly expected of looking for Lamisil.
(Misperception)
 Lack of perception  Aids for perceptual
systems
 Misperception  Display design
 Mis-anticipation
Interpretation
mistakes
A steady green light on an infusion pump
means the device is ready, and a ﬂashing green
light indicates an infusion is in progress. The
device user did not know the meaning of the
steady green light, and incorrectly interpreted
it as an indication that the infusion had begun.
(Incorrect knowledge)
 Incorrect knowledge  Education
 Incomplete knowledge  Representational aid
 Information overload  Information reduction
 Display design
Action evaluation
mistakes
In the infusion pump example shown in Fig. 3,
the user may not know that the device has
accepted the volume, and may then assume
that the goal (‘‘set volume to be infused at
1000 cc’’) has not been accomplished, leading
to a search for additional buttons (such as
‘‘enter’’) to complete the goal. (Incomplete
knowledge)
 Incorrect knowledge  Education
 Incomplete knowledge  Representational aid
 Information overload  Information reduction
 Display design
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Like execution slips, execution mistakes can occur at
the stages of goal, intention, action speciﬁcation, and
action execution. These correspond to the ﬁrst four
stages in the action cycle. Goal mistakes and intention
mistakes are mistakes about declarative knowledge,
which is knowledge about factual statements and
propositions, such as ‘‘Motrin is a pain reliever and fe-
ver reducer.’’ Action speciﬁcation mistakes and action
execution mistakes are mistakes about procedural
knowledge, which is knowledge about procedures and
rules, such as ‘‘give 1 tsp Motrin to a child per dosage upto four times a day if the child has fever or toothache
and the weight of the child is 24–35 lbs.’’
3.2.1.1. Goal mistakes. Goal mistakes are basically in-
correct goals set by some means. They can be caused by
many complex factors such as incorrect knowledge, in-
complete knowledge, misuse of knowledge, biases and
faulty heuristics, information overload, etc. For exam-
ple, neglect of base rate information could result in in-
correct diagnosis of a disease. This is a well-documented
ﬁnding in human decision making tasks [37,38]. As an-
other example, the goal of ‘‘treating the disease as
J. Zhang et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 37 (2004) 193–204 201pneumonia’’ could be a mistake if it is a misdiagnosis
based on incomplete knowledge (e.g., without X-ray
images).
3.2.1.2. Intention mistakes. Given a correct goal, the
intention of how to achieve the goal could be incorrect,
due to similar factors for goal mistakes. The intention
mistake example in Table 2 was due to incomplete
knowledge. The goal of giving oxygen between 1 and
2 liters per minute was correct. However, the intention
of setting the knob between 1 and 2 was incorrect be-
cause the physician did not have the knowledge that the
scale numbers on this speciﬁc device only represent
discrete, not continuous, settings [30].
3.2.1.3. Action speciﬁcation mistakes. Action speciﬁca-
tion mistakes are procedural mistakes that can be
caused by many factors such as lack of correct rules,
over generalized application of good rules, and encoding
deﬁciencies in rules. The example in Table 2 is due to the
lack of correct rules: ‘‘if the red signal is blinking,
ground the devices electrical system.’’ The operator in
this case did not have this rule. Procedural mistakes can
also be caused by over generalized application of good
rules. In this case, the condition part of a condition–
action rule could be misidentiﬁed and mismatched, thus
causing the ﬁring of the action part of the rule. Proce-
dural mistakes caused by encoding eﬃciencies of action
rules are usually due to the evolving nature of the rules
and unforeseeable conditions that cannot be encoded in
the rules.
3.2.1.4. Action execution mistakes. Action execution
mistakes can be caused by misapplication of good rules
and the dissociation between knowledge and rules. A
good rule may be misused because the user may have
incorrect or incomplete knowledge about the condition
of the rule in a speciﬁc context. The knowledge of a rule
and the knowledge of how to use a rule are not always
automatically linked together without extensive prac-
tice. This dissociation, due to the lack of experience and
practiced skills, may also lead to action execution mis-
takes. A good recipe may not lead to a good dish. For
example, perfect knowledge of a surgical procedure may
not lead to a successful surgical operation if the operator
has not extensively practiced the procedure.
3.2.2. Evaluation mistakes
Evaluation mistakes occur at the stages of Percep-
tion, Interpretation, and Evaluation on the evaluation
side of the action cycle.
3.2.2.1. Perception mistakes. Perception mistakes can be
caused by expectation-driven processing. What we per-
ceive is a function of the input and our expectations.
This is what allows us to read sloppy handwriting, orrecognize degraded images. However, our expectations
can also lead to misperceptions. For instance, a phar-
macist ﬁlling prescription for Lamisil (an antifungal)
mistakenly perceived Lamictal (an anticonvulsant) as
Lamisil. In this case the pharmacist clearly knows the
desired drug and is capable of correctly reading Lam-
ictal, but the expectation of looking for Lamisil resulted
in a perception mistake. Perception mistake can also
occur in the process of diagnosis. For example, a strong
anticipation of a speciﬁc diagnosis may lead to misper-
ception of an X-ray image.
3.2.2.2. Interpretation mistakes. Interpretation mistakes
are the incorrect interpretation of feedback caused by
incorrect or incomplete knowledge. For instance, sup-
pose that an infusion pump indicates readiness to begin
infusion using a steady green light and that the infusion
is in progress by ﬂashing the green light. If the device
user does not know the meaning of the steady green
light, he or she may incorrectly interpret it as an indi-
cation that the infusion has begun (an interpretation
mistake). In contrast, if a person is familiar with two
pumps that each give a diﬀerent meaning to a steady
green light, then erroneously interpreting the light on
Pump A as if it were on Pump B is an interpretation
slip—the user knows the correct interpretation, but fa-
miliarity with two inconsistent device interfaces leads to
the wrong interpretation.
3.2.2.3. Action evaluation mistakes. An action evaluation
mistake occurs when incorrect knowledge or incomplete
knowledge leads a person to erroneously judge the
completion or incompletion of a goal. In the infusion
pump example (Fig. 3), the user may not know that the
device has accepted the volume, and may then assume
that the goal (‘‘set volume to be infused at 1000 cc’’) has
not been accomplished, leading to a search for addi-
tional buttons (such as ‘‘enter’’) to complete the goal.
3.3. Implications of the taxonomy
The cognitive taxonomy we just described, although
still preliminary, oﬀers a systematic and theory-based
approach to the categorization of medical errors along
cognitive dimensions at the level of individuals and their
interactions with technology. It associates each type of
error with a speciﬁc set of underlying cognitive mecha-
nisms that oﬀer possible cognitive explanations for why
and how a speciﬁc error occurs. With further develop-
ment and reﬁnement, which will require substantial
theoretical and empirical work, it may become a theory
with predictive power.
Besides the above theoretical implications, the cog-
nitive taxonomy has at least two implications for ap-
plications: the development of cognitive interventions
and the design of medical error reporting systems.
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The cognitive taxonomy directly oﬀers strategies,
methods, and guidelines for the development of cognitive
interventions. With the identiﬁcation of the cognitive
mechanisms underlying a speciﬁc type of error, we can
use our knowledge and understanding of the mechanisms
to design cognitive interventions in terms of redesigning
the system, restructuring the organization, and re-edu-
cating the users. Although the cognitive taxonomy can-
not provide the details of each cognitive intervention, it
oﬀers general principles and guidelines. In the rightmost
columns of Tables 1 and 2, we listed high level guidelines
for cognitive interventions. For example, if an error is
identiﬁed as an intention slip due to the loss of activation
in memory, a memory aid should be introduced to ad-
dress the memory loss problem. An infusion pump might
display a message such as ‘‘Press Volume to enter volume
to be infused.’’ As another example, if an error is iden-
tiﬁed as an action speciﬁcation mistake due to the lack of
correct rules, re-educating the user is required. This
could also be done by redesigning a device, and this is
often a better choice. For instance, when using pumps
with set-based free ﬂow protection, nurses no longer
have to remember to close the clamp. The device has
been redesigned to eliminate the need for the rule. Our
cognitive taxonomy currently oﬀers only a starting point
for the development of cognitive interventions. More
studies are required to populate the taxonomy with more
cases, to reﬁne the theoretical foundation, and to gen-
erate more detailed guidelines for cognitive interven-
tions. These studies are currently under way in our
research laboratories. We are conducting ﬁeld studies to
identify types of errors and the conditions under which
such errors occur. The results from these naturalistic
studies will provide another dimension to our taxonomy,
where real-life constraints such as time pressure, stress,
and socio-cultural factors play a large role in potential
error management [42]. This way, we hope to capitalize
from both, laboratory-based carefully conducted heu-
ristic evaluation as well as the ethnographic and obser-
vational studies in the naturalistic environment [43].
3.3.2. Medical error reporting system
Another practical implication of our cognitive tax-
onomy is that it can provide systematic, principled
methods for the design of medical error reporting sys-
tems. Current systems for this purpose are based mostly
on free text in an unstructured format. Medical error
data collected in this way are rarely useful for the de-
tection of patterns, discovery of underlying factors, and
generation of solutions, because user-entered free text
does not contain the types of information needed to
propose interventions and it is diﬃcult to analyze in a
systematic way. Error reporting systems that do provide
coding schemes are often based on domain- or task-
speciﬁc error types. For example, the NCC MERPmedication error taxonomy includes codes for ‘‘Im-
proper dose resulting in over dosage’’ and ‘‘Computer
error due to incorrect selection from a list by computer
operator.’’ [32]. Domain speciﬁc taxonomies, such as
this one, allow us to analyze and discover error patterns
in speciﬁc care processes; however, they do not capture
the cognitive factors contributing to the error or provide
enough information to reasonably infer the role of
cognitive factors. For example, in the NCC MERP
taxonomy, cognitive factors can be coded only as
‘‘Performance Deﬁcit’’ or ‘‘Knowledge Deﬁcit’’ [31].
Medical error reporting systems should not be merely
record keeping systems. They should be systems for the
identiﬁcation of problems and generation of solutions.
We are currently in the process of designing an online
medical error reporting system that is based on our
cognitive taxonomy. In this system, questions and in-
quiries will be generated to encode cognitively relevant
information; the categorization of errors will be along
relevant cognitive dimensions; and it will be designed to
generate immediate recommendations on possible in-
tervention strategies.4. Conclusion
One critical step toward reducing medical errors in
particular and human errors in general is a cognitive
taxonomy of errors that can (1) categorize major types
of medical errors along cognitive dimensions, (2) asso-
ciate each type of medical errors to a speciﬁc underlying
cognitive mechanism, (3) describe how and explain why
a speciﬁc error occurs, and (4) generate intervention
strategies for each type of error. Based on Reasons [4]
deﬁnition of human errors and Normans [33] cognitive
theory of human action, we have developed a pre-
liminary action-based cognitive taxonomy of medical
errors that more or less satisﬁes these four criteria. Our
taxonomy can categorize major types of errors (slips and
mistakes) according to the stages of the action cycle. We
have identiﬁed a set of cognitive mechanisms (sub-
stantial but not exhaustive) that underlie each type of
slip or mistake. Our taxonomy can also explain why and
describe how a speciﬁc error occurs. With future devel-
opments we intend that our taxonomy will have enough
predictive power to help designers and implementers to
anticipate more eﬀectively when and where an error
might occur. Finally, at a high, conceptual level, we have
generated guidelines for the development of cognitive
interventions and have proposed a framework for the
development of medical error reporting systems that
over time can provide solutions or enhance prevention
of the kinds of errors that are reported.
Diﬀerent taxonomies of medical errors can be devel-
oped for diﬀerent purposes. The cognitive taxonomy we
developed here is for the purpose of describing, under-
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errors by considering the cognitive factors in medical
errors. We believe that these cognitive factors are fun-
damental to medial errors.Acknowledgments
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